Factions, police operations traumatize favela residents
“An invisible bomb.” That’s how Professor José Claudio Sousa Alves, from the Department of Social Sciences at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRRJ), describes the impact of police operations on the population, such as Operation Containment, considered the largest and deadliest in recent years in Rio de Janeiro.

Carried out last Tuesday (Oct. 28) in the favelas of Alemão and Penha, in the northern zone of Rio de Janeiro, the operation left at least 121 people dead and caused panic, with shootings, closures of businesses, schools, and health centers, blocked main roads, altered public transport routes, and burned buses. Bodies were left in the streets amid relatives and a horrified, grieving community. “The consequences will continue to be felt,” warns Alves.
“People develop diabetes, hypertension, emotional and mental disorders, sleep problems, strokes, vision issues, glaucoma, and numerous other health complications. It’s an invisible bomb,” says the professor, a leading expert on urban violence and public safety.
A study conducted by the Center for Studies on Security and Citizenship (Cesec) seeks to describe this scenario. It compared the health of residents in favelas exposed to frequent shootings involving state agents with that of people living in quieter communities with fewer armed confrontations.
The research showed, for example, that residents of favelas more exposed to shootings are more than twice as likely to develop depression and anxiety as those in other communities. They are also more likely to experience insomnia (73%) and high blood pressure (42%). A third of residents in these communities reported sweating, sleep disturbances, tremors, and shortness of breath during the shootings.
Union leader Raimunda de Jesus was among those who participated in the demonstration against Operation Containment, held in the Penha favela last Friday (31).
“What happened here doesn’t happen in the South Zone, in the wealthier areas, though there are bandits there too. We, who live in the periphery, are discriminated against. But the state cannot see us as enemies. It must care for and serve all its people,” she stated.
Liliane Santos Rodrigues, a resident of the Alemão favela, also attended the event. She lost her 17-year-old son, Gabriel Santos Vieira, just six months ago. He was riding on the back of a motorcycle for a delivery app, on his way to work, when he was shot five times during a police chase.
“I feel the pain of these mothers. It was a huge shock to see a young man killed in the same place where my son died. I haven’t been able to sleep properly for three days,” said Rodrigues.
Favelas
According to the Rio de Janeiro Security Secretariat, the Alemão and Penha favelas are considered strongholds of the Comando Vermelho (Red Command), with leaders from various states.
“There, several slum owners and leaders of local drug trafficking groups end up living. The few who are at large - most of Rio de Janeiro’s drug trafficking leaders are already imprisoned and continue to lead operations from prison - often have houses inside the Penha and Alemão favelas, where armed containment provides greater resistance. In other words, from the start of a police operation to its end, they have more time to hide, flee, or change houses,” says Carolina Grillo, coordinator of the Study Group on New Illegalities at the Federal Fluminense University (Geni/UFF).
These places, however, are not defined by crime alone. More than 110,000 people live there, and they are directly affected by police operations. Operations like this one, even with 113 arrests, deaths, and seizures, do not disrupt the structure of the Comando Vermelho, but they have a significant impact on the population, according to the researcher.
“Those who will be affected are the families of the murdered, the residents of that territory who will be traumatized forever,” Grillo states.
The operation targeted Comando Vermelho, a criminal organization that originated in the Rio de Janeiro prison system in the late 1970s. “It emerged from the conditions in the Caldeirão do Diabo prison on Ilha Grande, characterized by torture, death, and utterly degrading treatment, and it remains no different today. Comando Vermelho responded with an organizational capacity that shifted crime from bank robbery to drug trafficking, which is far more extensive. This Comando Vermelho has been growing,” says José Claudio Sousa Alves.
According to a technical note from the Brazilian Public Security Forum, Comando Vermelho is the country’s second-largest criminal organization. It is present in 24 states and the Federal District and maintains international connections for drug trafficking and other activities.
Research by Geni and Instituto Fogo Cruzado showed that Comando Vermelho was the only criminal faction to expand its territorial control in Greater Rio from 2022 to 2023. With an 8.4 percent increase, the organization surpassed the militias and came to control 51.9 percent of the areas dominated by criminals in the region.
According to the study, the militias reduced their controlled areas by 19.3 percent from 2022 to 2023, accounting for 38.9 percent of the territories under criminal control. The research also showed that Comando Vermelho regained 242 km² that had been lost to the militias in 2021. That year, 46.5 percent of areas under criminal control belonged to the militias, and 42.9 percent to Comando Vermelho.
The areas where the faction grew the most were the Baixada Fluminense and the Metropolitan East. The militias, on the other hand, suffered the greatest losses in the Baixada and in the western zone of Rio de Janeiro.
Not surprisingly, organized crime establishes itself and prospers in territories with vulnerable populations. “There is an almost inexhaustible supply of labor for criminal activity due to the very limited opportunities available to young people in Brazil today, as well as the country’s deep structural social inequalities,” says Carolina Grillo.
People pay the price
The way Comando Vermelho operates has also changed over time, no longer profiting solely from drug sales. According to Alves, this shift was mainly due to contact with the modus operandi of Rio de Janeiro’s militias, which exploit residents in the territories they control by charging for services and fees.
Although the operation seized tons of drugs - the total has not yet been specified - Civil Police Secretary Felipe Curi himself acknowledged that drugs are not the main source of funding for organized crime.
“Today, drugs account for only about 10 to 15 percent of the factions’ revenue. They realized that territory is synonymous with income, money, and economic exploitation - by exploiting everything within it: internet, gas, electricity, water, illegal constructions, and extorting merchants and residents, among other things. That is precisely what Comando Vermelho aims to do: economically exploit the territory,” said the secretary.
Combating crime
Both José Claudio Sousa Alves and Carolina Grillo argue that police operations are not the most effective way to combat organized crime. They point out that, despite operations carried out in recent years, organized crime has not lost territory.
According to the study by Geni and Fogo Cruzado, 3,603,440 residents of the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area live in territories controlled by militias (29.2%). Comando Vermelho dominates an area inhabited by 2,981,982 residents (24.2%), followed by Terceiro Comando with 445,626 (3.6%) and Amigo dos Amigos with 48,232 (0.4%). Just over 4.4 million inhabitants in the state of Rio live in neighborhoods still contested by criminal groups (36.2%).
“There are other strategic links that are addressed in a non-violent way. Operations targeting the financial arms of the PCC [Primeiro Comando da Capital] have been carried out without a single shot being fired,” says Carolina Grillo, citing Operation Hidden Carbon as an example.
Another example is the operation launched by the Federal Police in Rio de Janeiro that dismantled a criminal organization specialized in the production, assembly, and illegal trade of restricted firearms.
“It has a far greater disarmament effect on organized crime than actions focused on confrontation, which have a massive impact on society. They traumatize children, leave many families vulnerable, prevent people from working or taking their children to school, and subject them to irreparable trauma - without achieving any real liberation from the control of these armed groups,” says the researcher.
José Claudio Sousa Alves adds: “Where does all this drug money go? Who is operating it - is it the poor person from the Alemão favela? The small-time street seller? Where does all this money go? Is it with them? No, obviously not. There are much broader structures, including an international drug trafficking network. There are ways to investigate, and Operation Hidden Carbon shows that this is possible.”
Another possible course of action is to offer opportunities to residents of favelas and vulnerable areas, especially young people, so they do not join organized crime and strengthen the factions. According to the professor, “There are no proposals from the current government, much less from previous ones, for this large group of people who cannot access the job market, live in increasingly precarious conditions, and have no steady income.”
Carolina Grillo highlights the importance of the Pronasci Juventude program, from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, which aims to prevent violence and crime associated with illegal drug markets. Young people receive support for studies, training, and insertion into the job market.
*Tâmara Freire contributed to this report.